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ASARCO LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., LLC, 975 F.3d 859  
(9th Cir. 2020) 
 
Taylor A. Simpson 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In 2001, after over 100 years of operation, ASARCO, LLC 
(“Asarco”) shut down the East Helena lead smelting facility.1 After such 
an extensive and continuous operation, arsenic-laden waste contaminated 
most of the East Helena site and had leached into the groundwater; 
however, Asarco was not the sole contributor.2 The Anaconda Company 
(“Anaconda”) operated a zinc fuming plant that processed the arsenic-
laden byproducts of the lead smelter for nearly 50 years at the East Helena 
site.3 Through this process, Anaconda also contributed to the East Helena 
site’s contamination.4   
In 2005, Asarco filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. As part of this 
proceeding, Asarco reached a settlement agreement with the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).5 Pursuant to the settlement 
agreement, Asarco paid $111.4 million for cleanup and remediation of the 
East Helena site.6  Following this payment, in 2012, Asarco brought 
contribution claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) against Anaconda’s 
successor, Atlantic Richfield (“Atlantic”).7  
Finally, in September 2020, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Atlantic was responsible for contributing 
25 percent of Asarco’s incurred response costs. The court vacated the 
district court’s finding that the full settlement amount of $111.4 million 
was an incurred cost.8 The court remanded the case back to the district 
court to determine actual incurred response costs.9 The court held that the 
settlement amount Asarco paid was not eligible for contribution because 
half of it was not an “incurred” cost.10 The court stated incurred costs are 
either costs that have already been spent on remediation or non-speculative 
future remediation costs, such as the small amount of Asarco funds 
earmarked for specific purposes.11 However, the court ruled that the district 
court erred when considering speculative, future costs of remediation that 
 
1. ASARCO, LLC v. A. Richfield Co., LLC, 975 F.3d 859, 862 (9th 
Cir. 2020). 
2. Id.  
3. Id. at 862–63.  
4. Id.  
5. Id.  
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 867, 871.  
9. Id. at 868. 
10. Id. at 866–67. 
11. Id. at 866. 
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would use the remaining unspent $50 million. 12  In short, the unspent 
money was not an incurred cost because no concrete plan required using 
it. 
This case is important for entities facing liability and potential 
contribution claims under CERCLA. It can be used as a framework for 
determining what costs an entity could potentially be liable for, and what 
costs it could recoup. The court’s decision provides useful guidance to 
determine if future costs are eligible for contribution claims. However, the 
court did not analyze if certain response costs were “necessary.” By failing 
to address this, the court leaves uncertainty in whether a speculative, but 
necessary future cost could be an “incurred” cost and thus eligible for 
contribution.  
This case note will layout the applicable sections of CERCLA, 
provide a history of the East Helena site, the procedural history of this 
lengthy case, discuss and analyze the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, and finally 
discuss the potential impacts of this case.  
II.  CERCLA BACKGROUND 
In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA.13 CERCLA’s purpose is to 
investigate and cleanup sites heavily contaminated with hazardous waste, 
including, but not limited to, heavy metals.14 CERCLA presents the federal 
government with two options to avoid or remediate environmental 
contamination: removal actions and remedial actions.15 Removal actions 
are necessary for short term, prompt responses to  hazardous waste 
releases or threatened releases.16 In contrast, CERCLA designed long term 
remedial actions to permanently reduce hazardous waste release. 17 
Remedial actions are reserved only for sites on the National Priorities 
List.18 For a site to be listed, it must be subject to a site inspection and 
preliminary assessment followed by a remedial investigation and 
feasibility study.19 
Liability under CERCLA is far-reaching, both in terms of who is 
liable and how far back that liability extends. The wide net of CERCLA 
liability is retroactive, joint and several, and strict. 20  CERCLA’s 
retroactivity means parties are liable for any act that occurred before 
 
12. Id. at 864. 
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–28 (2018). 
14. Cornell Law School, Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), LEGAL INFORMATION INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/comprehensive_environmental_response_compens
ation_and_liability_act_(cercla) (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).  
15. Id.  
16. Id.  
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CERCLA’s enactment.21 This retroactivity has survived numerous legal 
challenges. In U.S. v. Monsanto, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that CERCLA’s retroactivity satisfies due process because “its liability 
scheme is rationally related to [a] valid legislative purpose.”22 The Fourth 
Circuit went on to state that CERCLA justifies retroactivity because it 
allows the costs of cleanup to spread across all parties “that played a role 
in creating the hazardous condition.”23   
Joint and several liability under CERCLA casts a wide net of 
liability, allowing any potentially responsible party (“PRP”) to be liable 
for an entire site cleanup, even when multiple parties caused 
contamination.24 CERCLA outlines four types of PRPs: (1) current owners 
and operators; (2) past owners and operators at the time hazardous waste 
was disposed; (3) generators and entities who arranged for disposal of 
hazardous materials; and (4) transporters of hazardous materials who 
selected a site for disposal.25 PRPs can be responsible for governmental 
cleanup costs, damages to natural resources, costs of certain health 
assessments, and injunctive relief (actual cleanup of the site).26  
CERCLA allows parties during or following any civil action 
under CERCLA to seek contribution of costs from any other PRPs.27 A 
CERCLA facility operator is liable to other operators for “any other 
necessary costs of response incurred.” 28  CERCLA enables courts to 
allocate costs among liable parties by “using such equitable factors as the 
court determines.” 29  This gives courts broad discretion in how they 
allocate costs.30 However, courts typically rely on the six Gore factors,31 
which include: (1) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their 
contribution to a discharge, release, or disposal of a hazardous waste can 
be distinguished; (2) the amount of the hazardous waste involved; (3) the 
degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved; (4) the degree of 
involvement by the parties in the generation, transportation, treatment, 
storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste; (5) the degree of care 
exercised by the parties with respect to the hazardous waste concerned, 
taking into account the characteristics of such hazardous waste; and (6) the 
degree of cooperation by the parties with federal, state, or local officials 
to prevent any harm to public health or the environment.32 
 
21. Superfund Liability, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ 
enforcement/superfund-liability (last visited Oct. 17, 2020). 
22. U.S. v. Monsanto, 858 F. 2d 160, 173 (4th Cir. 1988). 
23. Id. at 174.  
24. Superfund Liability, supra note 21.  
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4); Superfund Liability, supra note 21. 
26. Id.  
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9607. 
28. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added). 
29. Id. § 9613(f)(1). 
30. TDY Holdings, LLC v. U.S., 885 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2018). 
31. Id. at 1146. 
32. Envtl. Transp. Sys., Inc. v. ENSCO, Inc., 969 F.2d 503, 508 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
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III.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND  
The East Helena smelter site (the “Site”) has a long history of 
constant and prolific production of lead and zinc. The EPA became 
involved relatively recently in the Site’s history when, in 1984, the Site 
was added to the National Priorities List, Asarco entered a settlement 
agreement, and remediation finally commenced. 
A.  History of Operations 
 Asarco’s predecessors began a lead smelting operation in East 
Helena in 1881. 33  The smelting facility ran continuously until 2001. 34 
Despite several other smelting operations at the Site, Asarco’s lead 
smelting operation remained the largest.35 Asarco recovered lead from a 
myriad of sources such as ores, fluxes, and other non-ferrous, metalbearing 
materials.36 These sources of lead contained arsenic concentrations as high 
as 190,000 parts per million.37  Lead smelting creates an arsenic laden 
waste product called slag which Asarco stored in a giant pile at the Site.38 
In addition to the slag, other sources of arsenic included a sludge created 
by capturing dust and gas to convert into sulfuric acid.39 Due to these 
prevalent arsenic sources involved in Asarco’s operations, the court found 
it is undisputed that Asarco’s operations “released significant amounts of 
arsenic into the environment.”40 However, the lead smelter was not the 
only source of arsenic contamination at the Site. 
 Anaconda, Atlantic’s predecessor, leased a part of the Site to 
operate a zinc fuming plant. This plant was operational from 1927 to 
1976.41 Anaconda reprocessed Asarco’s discarded slag to extract zinc; a 
process which released arsenic. Arsenic sources during the zinc fuming 
process included, but were not limited to, coal and fly ash byproducts, 
visible effluent released directly into the atmosphere, and slag waste 
removal from the furnace.42  
B.  EPA Involvement 
In 1984, the EPA added the Site to CERCLA’s National Priorities 
List.43 This list serves as a guide for the EPA in “determining which sites 
 
33. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 862. 





39. Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO LLC at 8, June 12, 2019, No. 
18-35934. 
40. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 862. 
41. Id. at 863.  
42. Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO LLC at 4–5, June 12, 2019, 
No. 18-35934. 
43. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 863. 
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warrant further investigation.”44 EPA’s primary concern regarding the Site 
was arsenic contamination.45 In 1990, Asarco entered into a CERCLA 
consent decree with the EPA, which resolved Asarco’s liability for 
remediation of the Site’s process ponds, but required Asarco to implement 
remedial plans related to the process ponds. 46  By 1997, the EPA had 
substantially completed remediation of the ponds.47  
In 2005, Asarco filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.48 As part of these 
proceedings, the United States, the State of Montana, and the Montana 
Department of Environmental Quality filed proofs of claim addressing 
Asarco’s projected CERCLA liability.49 In February and June of 2009, 
Asarco finally reached two complementary settlement agreements and 
consent decrees with the United States and Montana.50 These consents and 
decrees resolved Asarco’s environmental liabilities at the Site. However, 
the June decree required Asarco to pay a substantial amount of money to 
be used for cleanup and remediation of the Site.51 
Asarco was responsible for the remediation fees of several other 
sites throughout Montana. For the Site alone, Asarco paid $111.4 million52 
in remediation expenses.53 The June decree contained a reversion provision 
that ensured redirection of any unused money to the cleanup of Asarco’s 
other contaminated properties in Montana.  
C.  Remediation of the Site 
The June decree appointed the Montana Environmental Trust 
Group (“METG”) as the custodial trustee for the Site. 54  METG is an 
“independent, non-profit entity created to clean up, restore, and revitalize 
the hazardous waste sites once owned by [Asarco] in the state of 
Montana.”55 After years of studies and EPA approval, METG implemented 
 
44. Superfund Liability, supra note 21.  
45. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 863. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Cornell Law School, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, LEGAL INFORMATION 
INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/chapter_11_bankruptcy (last visited Oct. 17, 
2020) (“Chapter 11 bankruptcy is the formal process that allows debtors and creditors 
to resolve the problem of the debtor’s financial shortcomings through a reorganization 
plan.”). 
49. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 863. 
50. Id.  
51. Id. 
52. Broken down, this includes $99.294 million to the East Helena 
Custodial Trust Cleanup Account, $6,402,743 toward the establishment and 
administration of a custodial trust, $707,000 to the Department of Interior for both 
restoration and future oversight costs, and $5 million to the State of Montana for 
compensatory damages at the Site. Id.  
53. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 863. 
54. Id. 
55. Montana Environmental Trust Group, The Custodial Trust, 
MONTANA ENVIRONMENTAL TRUST GROUP, https://www.mtenvironmentaltrust.org/ 
about-metg/the-custodial-trust (last visited Oct. 17, 2020). 
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three remediation projects known as “interim measures.” 56  The first 
interim measure reduced movement of contaminated groundwater. The 
second measure removed contaminated soil to prevent ongoing sources of 
arsenic contamination. The third and final measure constructed 
evapotranspiration cover using soil and vegetation over nearly the whole 
Site.57 By the time trial occurred, METG had implemented all three 
measures and stated that these measures “comprise much of the final 
remedy for the Site.”58 Finally, METG planned to cap the slag pile.59  
Through the course of remediation, METG spent approximately 
half of the available $111.4 million in remediation funds.60 It is estimated 
that capping the slag pile will cost $3.7 million, and ongoing costs for the 
Site’s operations and maintenance will cost $9.2 million.61 Total cleanup 
costs, therefore, are estimated to be $61.4 million.62 Despite Atlantic’s 45-
year operation at the Site, it had not contributed any funds to the cleanup.63  
IV.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Asarco first brought its CERCLA contribution claim against 
Atlantic in 2012.64 Because Atlantic had not paid any amount in cleanup 
costs, Asarco sought contribution for the $111.4 million it paid to the EPA 
when it settled its liability for the Site.65 The district court granted summary 
judgement in favor of Atlantic.66 The district court found that because 
Asarco sought contribution for remedial work conducted pursuant to the 
1998 consent decree, the three-year statute of limitations barred Asarco’s 
claim.67 Asarco appealed to the Ninth Circuit where the court vacated the 
summary judgment for Atlantic. 68  The Ninth Circuit concluded that 
because the language used in the 1998 consent decree did not resolve 
Asarco’s liability, it did not trigger CERCLA’s statute of limitations.69 
Therefore, the court remanded the case for a trial on the merits.70  
 On remand, the district court held an eight-day bench trial that was 
“weighted heavily toward expert testimony.”71 After the trial concluded, 
 
56. Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 16, May 13, 
2019, No. 18-35934. 
57. Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 17–18. 
58. Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 17. 
59. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 864.  
60. Id. 
61. Id.  
62. Id.  
63. Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 15. 
64. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 864.  
65. Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 28; Answering 
Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO LLC at 15. 
66. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 864.  
67. Id. at 3; Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 28. 
68. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 864. 
69. Id.  
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
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the district court issued judgment in favor of Asarco. The district court 
found Atlantic liable under CERCLA for 25 percent of Asarco’s incurred 
cleanup costs of $111.4 million (i.e. $27,850,936). 72  Based on the 
extensive findings from each parties’ operations, the district court 
concluded that Atlantic’s zinc fuming plant did release and contribute 
arsenic into groundwater at the Site.73 Further, the district court reasoned 
that a 25 percent allocation was warranted based on expert testimony, 
application of the Gore factors, and the duration of each parties’ operations 
at the Site.74 
 In addition to the 25 percent allocation, the district court awarded 
Asarco $1 million because it found Atlantic failed to cooperate with 
authorities and made multiple misrepresentations to the EPA. 75 
Specifically, Atlantic submitted false and misleading statements and 
withheld pertinent documents from the EPA regarding its releases at the 
Site.76  
 Following the district court’s ruling, Atlantic moved to alter or 
amend the judgment, arguing an error in the allocation of 25 percent of the 
$111.4 million paid by Asarco.77 Atlantic contended that the allocation 
should be based on how much of Asarco’s payment METG had spent on 
remediation. 78  The district court rejected this argument and Atlantic 
appealed.79  
V.  HOLDING 
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in including 
speculative future costs when determining what necessary response costs 
were eligible for contribution by Atlantic.80 CERCLA entitles parties to 
recover a portion of the “necessary costs of responses incurred.”81 The 
court ruled that the district court improperly included costs “that had not 
yet been, and might never be, incurred,” as well as costs that were not 
necessary for protection of human health and the environment.82 The court 
reasoned that the $111.4 million was not a fully incurred cost and 
remanded back to the lower court.83 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to allocate 
25 percent of the response costs to Atlantic.84 CERCLA empowers courts 
to “allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable 
 
72. Id. 
73. Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 15.  
74. Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 16. 
75. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 864.  
76. Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 16. 
77. Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 16. 
78. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 864. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B); ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 864. 
82. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 864. 
83. Id. at 868. 
84. Id.  
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factors as the court determines are appropriate.”85 The district court based 
its analysis on the Gore factors and expert witnesses in order to tabulate 
each party’s responsibility for contamination. The court affirmed the 
district court’s decision because it properly assessed the underlying 
equities and evidence with “sufficient rigor and care.”86   
VI.  CASE ANALYSIS 
Parties presented the Ninth Circuit with two issues on appeal: 
whether the district court erred in including speculative future costs in its 
calculation of response costs; and whether the district court erred by 
allocating 25 percent of response costs to Atlantic.  
When reviewing a district court’s findings of fact after a bench 
trial, the court reviews for clear error.87 The court reviews conclusions of 
law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo.88 CERCLA gives district 
courts broad discretion in both the cost allocation for contribution claims 
and what factors to use in determining the allocation.89  Therefore, a 
reviewing court should “reverse only for an abuse of the discretion to 
select factors, or for clear error in the allocation according to those 
factors.”90  
A.  Response Costs Incurred 
The first issue the court reviewed was whether the district court 
properly determined the summation of necessary response costs Atlantic’s 
allocation of costs should be based on. The allocation costs could be either 
a portion of the full settlement amount Asarco paid to the EPA (“Total 
Costs,” i.e. $111.4 million) or the total amount of money spent on cleanup 
to date (“Cleanup Costs,” i.e. $48.5 million). Atlantic wanted allocation 
based on Cleanup Costs because it would result in lower allocation costs.  
CERCLA states that a party is “entitled to recover an allocated 
proportion of the ‘necessary costs of response incurred.’” 91  Thus, 
allocation hinges on what response costs are considered “incurred.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “incur” as “to suffer or bring on oneself 
(a liability or expense).” 92  Asarco argued that this broad definition 
included its Total Costs.  
Relying on the Black’s Law definition, Asarco argued that its 
payment satisfied the definition of an “incurred cost.”93 Asarco suffered 
 
85. Id. at 868. 
86. Id. at 871.  
87. OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Haas Indus., Inc., 634 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
88. Id.  
89. U.S. v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002). 
90. Id.  
91. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 865 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)). 
92. Incur, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
93. Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 22. 
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and brought upon itself the Total Costs for recovery.94 Asarco used the 
reversion provision in the settlement offer to demonstrate that the Total 
Costs were clearly intended to fund the Site’s cleanup.95 Asarco argued 
that because the reversion provision did not allow the return of any funds, 
the Total Cost was “incurred.”96  
However, Atlantic noted that the language in CERCLA uses the 
past tense of “incurred.”97 Atlantic reasoned that because the statute uses 
the past tense, the necessary response costs must have already been 
suffered to qualify for allocation or contribution.98 Atlantic relied heavily 
on case law to support this distinction.99 The Ninth Circuit previously dealt 
with the meaning of “necessary response costs incurred” several times. 
Notably, in In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 100 the court stated that CERCLA 
“permits an action for response costs ‘incurred’—not ‘to be incurred.’”101 
Atlantic used this precedent to argue that the money not yet spent on 
cleanup was not “incurred” since it was not used in remediation efforts.102 
If this money was already spent, or even earmarked for specific use, then 
it would likely be an “incurred” cost.103  
Asarco attempted to differentiate itself from the cases Atlantic 
cited. 104  In In re Dant & Russell, Burlington Northern Railroad 
(“Burlington”) sought contribution on $1 million already spent on 
remediation and a further $13 million in “anticipated” future cleanup 
costs.105 Burlington made no concrete commitment of resources for future 
cleanup, and therefore, the court ruled it was not an incurred cost. 106 
Asarco tried to distinguish itself from In re Dant & Russell by stating it 
had both committed and fully paid $111.4 million in cleanup costs, so 
these were concrete, incurred costs.107  
 Asarco’s reasoning did not persuade the court, and it sided with 
Atlantic.108 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in AmeriPride Servs. Inc. v. Texas 
E. Overseas Inc., held that “the full dollar value of a settlement agreement 
to discharge CERCLA liability is not automatically subject to 
 
94. Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 22. 
95. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 865.  
96. Id.  
97. Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 38. 
98. Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 38. 
99. See e.g. Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1021– 
22 (9th Cir. 1993); Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 920 F. Supp. 1121, 1133 (D. Or. 
1996).  
100. 951 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1991).  
101. Id. at 249–50.  
102. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 865 
103. Opening Br. Def./Appellant Atlantic Richfield Co. at 38–39. 
104. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 865.  
105. In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d at 247. 
106. Id.  
107. Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 24. 
108. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 865.  
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contribution.” 109  While the full settlement amount can be the same as 
necessary response costs incurred, it is not inherent.110 With this statement, 
the court reasoned that for a full settlement amount to be incurred, all the 
available funds must be spent, or earmarked for specific remedial 
purposes.111 Applying this reasoning, the court rejected Asarco’s notion 
that by paying $111.4 million, it was an incurred cost and thus subject to 
contribution.112  
The court further instilled this point when it said, “‘incur’ is 
sufficiently broad that it does not require an expense already be paid, but 
is also not so broad that it encompasses future expenses that are mere 
potentialities.” 113  Importantly, the court concluded that “speculative, 
potential future response costs” are not recoverable costs for contribution 
claims.114 Based on this logic, for a full settlement to be incurred and 
subject to contribution, it either has to be spent or be a concrete, future 
cost.  
 The court’s conclusion on speculative, potential future response 
costs led the court to analyze whether future remediation efforts by METG 
were speculative or concrete. The court relied heavily on the facts of the 
case to determine what was a concrete future cost and what was 
speculative. Asarco’s settlement figure was based largely on the 
presumption that the Site would require a costly “pump-and-treat” 
remediation effort.115 However, at the time of this case, METG no longer 
planned to use the pump-and-treat method. METG stated that the method 
was “too costly, potentially ineffective, and risky in that it could affect the 
stability of the arsenic-contaminated groundwater plume.” 116  Instead, 
METG proposed remedies that would only cost $12.9 million and bring 
the total Cleanup Costs to $61.4 million.117 The court held the pump-and-
treat system was not a concrete cost. 118 
 Asarco attempted to push back on METG’s plans by offering 
expert testimony. Asarco’s expert, Margaret Staub, opined that the Site 
required further remediation work, beyond METG’s cheaper solution, to 
restore groundwater to acceptable levels.119 Critically, Staub would not 
definitively say what final remedy would achieve acceptable groundwater 
levels, only that “something at some point is going to have to be done.”120 
Staub’s opinion is the exact kind of speculation that the court repeatedly 
admonished as factors of contribution costs. The court held that because 
 
109. AmeriPride Services Inc. v. Texas Eastern Overseas Inc., 782 F.3d 
474, 490 (9th Cir. 2015). 
110. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 866. 
111. Id.  
112. Id.  
113. Id.; see Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 958 (8th Cir. 2000). 
114. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 866. 
115. Id.  
116. Id at 867. 
117. Id.  
118. Id. at 866. 
119. Id. at 867; Answering Br. Pl./Appellee ASARCO at 41–42. 
120. ASARCO, 975 F.3d at 867. 
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METG had not paid or assumed an obligation to use the pump-and-treat 
method, any response costs remain speculative.121  
 The court went on to explain that the district court erred in relying 
on Staub’s testimony to conclude that the Total Cost was an incurred cost. 
In reaching this finding, the district court reasoned that because some 
future remediation work would still be required, the Total Cost was 
eligible for contribution. 122  The court, while agreeing that future 
remediation efforts are likely needed, concluded that those future 
remediation efforts were “not adequately tethered to any concrete evidence 
in the record.”123 The court explained the unspent $50 million was not an 
incurred cost since it was neither spent nor a concrete, future cost. 124 
Therefore, the court concluded that the full settlement amount of $111.4 
million was improper for the contribution claim. The court ruled that the 
district court erred in including speculative, future costs when it was 
determining the necessary response costs eligible for contribution. 
The court then remanded the case back to the district court to 
determine actual incurred response costs.125 On remand, the district court 
will likely calculate the incurred costs based on the $48.5 million already 
spent, plus $12.9 million for capping the slag pile and ongoing operations 
and maintenance of the Site. The $12.9 million is a concrete, future cost 
and will likely be considered incurred. Accordingly, Atlantic may have to 
contribute a percentage of $61.4 million, rather than $111.4 million.126  
B.  Allocation of Response Costs 
The second issue the court reviewed was whether the district court 
properly determined Atlantic’s 25 percent allocated portion. Under 
CERCLA, a district court is able to “allocate response costs among liable 
parties using such equitable facts as the court determines are 
appropriate.”127 Therefore, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviews the lower 
court’s choice of what equitable factors to rely on under an abuse of 
discretion standard.128 Then, the court reviews the lower court’s application 
of its chosen factors in determining allocation for clear error.129  
The court concluded, as an initial matter, that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in relying on the six Gore factors for its allocation 
analysis.130 The court explained that the Gore factors are a well-established 
method of allocation, which the court has previously upheld on multiple 
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occasions.131 The court further stated the district court also acted within its 
discretion by relying heavily on expert testimony to tabulate each parties’ 
responsibility for contamination.132 Much to the protest of Atlantic, the 
court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
determining that allocation did not need to be calculated with 
mathematical certainty.133 The court asserted the district court was well 
within its right to rely on “general principles of fairness” instead. 134 
Because the court found no abuse of discretion in the factors the district 
court chose to employ, it next examined the application of those factors 
for clear error.135  
The court, to determine if the district court abused its discretion, 
examined the district court’s application of the Gore factors and its 
reliance on expert witnesses.  
1.  Gore Factors 
The first Gore factor looks at the ability of each party to 
demonstrate that a contribution of discharge can be distinguished from 
each other.136 The district court struggled with this factor because of sparse 
historical records of the Site dealing with “the precise nature and amount 
of pollutants.” 137  The district court partially credited Atlantic’s 
“longstanding denial of responsibility” with deficiencies in the historical 
record.138 Despite a sparse historic record, the district court concluded the 
record revealed enough information on each party’s historic 
contributions.139  
The court merely mentioned the second and third Gore factors, 
which look at the amount and degree of the hazardous waste’s toxicity.140 
The fourth Gore factor examines the degree of involvement from each 
party in the transportation, treatment, storage, disposal, or generation of 
hazardous waste.141 The district court, as well as the parties, recognized 
that Asarco was responsible for the majority of contamination requiring 
remediation.142 Still, Atlantic processed vast quantities of arsenic-laden 
substances and created large amounts of waste at the Site.143 The district 
court acknowledged that it was unable to quantify Atlantic’s past releases, 
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but the court noted the City of Helena repeatedly complained to Atlantic 
about the amount of fly ash and coal being released into the air.144  
The fifth Gore factor examines the degree of care each party used 
when dealing with hazardous waste.145 The district court analyzed how 
each party attempted to protect the environment as well as failures to do 
so.146 The district court noted that Asarco adopted intensive preventative 
measures towards the end of its operations.147  
The court analyzed the sixth and final Gore factor, which 
examines the cooperation between the parties and federal, state, or local 
officials to prevent environmental harm.148 This factor did not weigh in 
Atlantic’s favor. The district court noted that Atlantic had “repeatedly 
evaded responsibility for any environmental contamination at the Site, 
flagrantly misled the EPA regarding its releases at the Site, and made 
ongoing misrepresentations throughout the course of the litigation.” 149 
Because of Atlantic’s deceptive behaviors, and pursuant to the sixth Gore 
factor, the district court awarded a $1 million uncertainty premium.150 
Atlantic, unsurprisingly, took issue with this on appeal. The court, 
however, upheld the district court’s decision, saying that it was not only 
consistent for the district court to award those costs for egregiousness 
pursuant to the sixth Gore factor, but also that the district court was right 
to factor in Atlantic’s non-cooperation when weighing other aspects of 
allocation.151  
2.  Battle of the Experts 
In addition to the six Gore factors, the district court relied heavily 
on expert testimony in determining allocation. Asarco’s expert proposed 
three liability allocation strategies for the district court to consider. These 
strategies proposed allocation percentages ranging from 25 percent to 41 
percent of remediation costs.152 The district court found Asarco’s expert’s 
testimony “to be compelling and persuasive.”153 The district court was less 
persuaded by Atlantic’s expert testimony which focused on challenging 
Atlantic’s liability and asserting that Atlantic should have no 
responsibility for cleanup. Atlantic’s expert largely left Asarco’s expert’s 
opinions unchallenged because the expert placed his efforts on asserting 
Atlantic had no legal cleanup responsibilities.154  
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Ultimately, the district court rejected Atlantic’s proposed zero 
percent allocation and Asarco’s higher 41 percent allocation instead opting 
for Asarco’s proposed 25 percent allocation.155 The district court found the 
25 percent allocation to be the most appealing because it factored in the 
varying time periods of ownership.156  
To rebut Atlantic’s argument that the district court’s decision was 
insufficient in its reasoning, the Ninth Circuit noted that the district court’s 
95-page decision “is expansive and detailed, and it thoughtfully grapples 
with a challenging case.”157 Citing Traxler v. Multnomah County,158 the 
court noted that decisions “need not be articulated with perfection” to meet 
the standards set in case law.159 Since the Ninth Circuit did not find the 
district court erred in determining Atlantic’s allocation responsibility, it 
affirmed that Atlantic is responsible for 25 percent of the incurred cost.160 
VII. IMPACTS OF THE CASE 
 This case is important for entities facing liability and potential 
contribution claims under CERCLA when determining potential cost 
liabilities and opportunities to recover costs. The Ninth Circuit’s decision 
will provide useful guidance to determine if future costs are eligible for 
contribution claims. However, some remaining uncertainties could make 
it difficult for parties to determine what costs are in play under a CERCLA 
contribution claim. These uncertainties include the court’s dismissal of the 
term “necessary” in determining incurred costs. 
A.  “Necessary” Response Costs 
The court failed to address whether a pump-and-treat system 
would be a necessary response cost. 161  This leaves an amount of 
uncertainty for future CERCLA contribution claims. The court had 
previously dismissed the “necessary” requirement in other Ninth Circuit 
opinions such as Stanton Road, where the court held that if a cleanup has 
not taken place, a party planning the cleanup “cannot establish that it 
incurred expenses that were ‘necessary’ response costs eligible for 
contribution.”162  
In this case, the court aligned its ruling with Stanton Road by 
stating that it did not need to address whether a pump-and-treat system 
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would be necessary because “such costs have not been incurred.”163 By 
refusing to address the necessity of the pump-and-treat system, the court 
removed “necessary” from the incurred cost analysis. Under the district 
court’s holding and Asarco’s argument, an incurred cost can either be a 
cost that has already been spent, or a necessary future cost. The Ninth 
Circuit rejected this notion by stating “because such costs have not been 
incurred, they cannot be awarded even if they satisfy the remaining 
requirements for contribution eligibility.” 164  Under the court’s view, 
incurred costs are only those that have already been spent on cleanup or 
that are non-speculative, ear-marked future costs. This will create 
difficulty when companies try to determine the percentage of allocation. 
Both parties argued about the importance of what a necessary 
response cost entailed. Atlantic focused on CERCLA’s language, 
declaring the phrase “necessary response costs” a “term of art.”165 Both 
Atlantic and Asarco stated that a “touchstone” in determining if a response 
cost is necessary is whether there is an actual threat to the environment.166 
A response cost is necessary if it will remedy a threat to the environment.167 
Asarco referred to expert testimony that groundwater at the Site needed to 
be restored to “health-based water quality standards.”168 Asarco argued 
that this standard and the associated pump-and-treat system, is one of the 
reasons that prompted its $111.4 million payment. Asarco pointed out that 
this goal of clean water has still not been achieved and that METG’s 
current plans will not meet those goals.169 Therefore, Asarco argued that 
the entire $111.4 million was a necessary response cost to achieve the goal 
of health-based water standards. The district court agreed with Asarco and 
concluded that Atlantic’s releases of arsenic at the Site “caused Asarco to 
incur ‘necessary’ response costs.”170  
By eliminating “necessary response costs” from an analysis of 
incurred response costs, the Ninth Circuit removed a tool that may provide 
clarification on what a non-speculative future cost is. It stands to reason 
that a cost which is necessary in remediating a site would be non-
speculative. It would be a necessary cost if it was known to all parties 
involved that a certain goal had to be met in remediation to stop an 
environmental threat. It would be a non-speculative future cost if there was 
a concrete method to achieve this goal. If the goal had to be met, but there 
was uncertainty on how to best achieve that goal, under the court’s current 
view, this would be a speculative, future cost. However, by allowing an 
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analysis of whether the response cost was necessary to achieve that goal, 
the costs could still be incurred and be eligible for contribution. 
Based on the court’s holding in this case and cases such as Stanton 
Road, it appears likely that Ninth Circuit wants to avoid any speculation 
when it comes to contribution claims. The response costs must be incurred 
insofar that it has already been spent or that it is a concrete, future cost. By 
removing “necessary” from the incurred cost analysis, the court is keeping 
out speculative costs, even though the costs might be necessary for 
remediation. This favors CERCLA policy over a company’s bottom line  
and creates greater financial burdens on those companies.  
B.  Contribution Claims in the Future 
While this opinion provides guidance to determine if future costs 
are eligible for contribution claims, the remaining uncertainties make 
specificity incredibly important in settlement agreements and contribution 
claims. To receive contribution from other PRPs, parties must make sure 
they are aware of what costs are actually “incurred.” This entails knowing 
with some certainty what future costs are concrete and non-speculative. 
The Gore factors continue to be one of the best methods to help determine 
allocation. However, because the Gore factors allow for discretion from 
the court, there is still a layer of uncertainty in their application. 
By the court’s holding that speculative, future costs will not be 
considered “incurred,” parties will likely be incentivized to wait until the 
last possible moment to bring a contribution claim. Waiting until cleanup 
is finished is the only guaranteed way to know what a party’s incurred 
costs truly are. However, this could mean that parties seeking contribution 
will, initially, pay out-of-pocket for all remediation expenses since filing 
a contribution claim early could result in future costs not being “incurred.” 
For smaller companies, this could be economically infeasible because the 
company might have to risk seeking contribution before it is certain what 
its incurred costs actually are. Further, because the court held 
mathematical certainty is not required in determining allocation 
proportions, it could be difficult for parties to whom contribution is sought 
to determine just how much money they will have to pay.  
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 ASARCO v. Atlantic Richfield provides a useful guide for entities 
to determine what costs they could either recoup or be responsible for 
under a CERCLA contribution claim. While the Ninth Circuit created 
some ambiguity around whether response costs are “necessary,” parties in 
contribution claims should more clearly be able to determine what future 
costs are considered “incurred” and eligible for contribution. CERCLA 
can be an effective tool in providing the appropriate funds for the cleanup 
of contaminated sites. This case continues to uphold CERCLA’s far 
reaching liability while allowing potentially responsible parties to recover 
a portion of the cleanup costs from other responsible entities. 
